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THE PROPRIETY OF GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR DEFENDANTS IN DEFAMATION SUITS
INVOLVING ACTUAL MALICE
I. INTRODUCTION

The law of defamation requires an accommodation between two
competing values held in esteem by American society.' On the one
hand, we hold our freedom of speech in high regard 2 and recognize
a profound commitment to uninhibited debate of public issues.3 On
the other hand, we also protect the individual's interest in reputation
by allowing a person whose reputation is injured by a defamatory falsehood 4 to bring an action for damages.5 In the area of media comment
1. See Hanson, The Right to Know: Fair Comment - Twentieth Century,

12 VILL. L. REv. 751 (1967). Mr. Hanson stated that
the law of libel is vastly affected by the first amendment and by its
application to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Individual rights protected by other amendments to our Constitution must
be accommodated to the first and, as in all constitutional law, there
must be give and take ....
Id.

But cf. Green, The New York Times Rule: Judicial Overkill, 12 VILL. L.

REV. 730 (1967) ("fundamental constitutional changes [such as in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan] are best wrought when they are forged to meet an
urgent, deeply felt, firmly established need, which can be met in no other way").
2. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .......
U.S.
CONsT. amend. I. The amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but

we have staked upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Learned Hand, J.).

The first amendment was made applicable to the states through the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The first and fourteenth amendments
not only prohibit the states from making "laws" - that is, criminal statutes -

that restrain these freedoms, but also prohibit the adoption of rules of tort law
which would restrain such expression, as a civil damage award may be as inhibiting as a criminal prosecution. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 277 (1964).

3. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).

For a

discussion of New York Times, see notes 25-48 and accompanying text infra.
4. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 737 (4th ed. 1971). Reputation is the
opinion which others in the community may have of an individual. Id. The
law protects this interest in reputation from injury due to false statements made
by others. Id.; L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 8-9 (1978). A defamatory falsehood is a false statement "which tends to injure 'reputation' in the
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which
the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or
opinions against him." W. PROSSER, supra, at 739 (footnotes omitted). See

also R.

SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS

45-48 (Practising Law

Institute 1980).
5. L. ELDREDGE, supra note 4, at 4-6. Eldredge lists three purposes of the
cause of action: obtaining compensation for harm; obtaining vindication of

(470)
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on public officials,' or public figures 7 the clash between these values is
particularly acute - what is to be the balance struck when in the
course of debate such an individual is defamed? While the protection of
speech is not absolute,8 the law recognizes that the greater the risk of
a defendant's being held liable, the greater the adverse impact on the
quality of the debate; 9 a potential defendant may engage in self-censorship rather than risk exposure to liability in a defamation action. 10
In response to this fear of self-censorship, the United States Supreme Court has raised a constitutional barrier which public officials
and public figures seeking compensation for injury to their reputations
must hurdle." Such individuals must prove that the defendants made
the defamatory statement knowing that it was false or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, i.e., with "actual malice." 12 This requirement has not, however, completely alleviated the fear of selfcensorship.' 8 A number of trial courts, concerned that self-censorship
one's reputation; and punishing the conduct of the defendant so as to deter
others. Id.
Defamation law is comprised of the "twin torts" of libel and slander.
W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 737. Slander deals with defamatory statements
which are spoken; libel with those that are written. Id. The elements common
to both causes of action which the plaintiff must plead and prove are: 1) the
defamatory words themselves; 2) that the words were communicated to a person
other than the plaintiff (the "publication"); 3) any extrinsic facts which give
the statement its defamatory meaning (the "inducement"); 4) that the words
referred to the plaintiff (the "colloquium"); 5) the defamatory meaning alleged
(the "innuendo"); and 6) that pecuniary loss has been sustained by the plaintiff.
W. PROSSER, J. WADE 8: V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 968 (6th
ed. 1976). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
6. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
notes 27-49 and accompanying text infra.

7. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
50-83 and accompanying text infra.
8. See Leflar, The Free-ness of Free Speech, 15

VAND.

L.

REV.

See

See notes
1073, 1080

(1962) (The framers did not intend the freedom of speech to be absolute, but
rather only intended the first amendment to maintain the concept of free
speech as it then existed). But see Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 95 (1966)
(Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The only sure way to
protect speech and press . . . is to recognize that libel laws are abridgements
of speech and press and therefore are barred in both federal and state courts
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments").
9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). The threat
of liability "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate." Id.
10. Id.
11. For a discussion of the difficulty of surmounting this obstacle, see
L. ELDREDGE, supra note 4, at 270-71.
12. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public

official). For a discussion of the "actual malice" standard, see notes 25-71 and
accompanying text infra.
13. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 456
(1975). The "actual malice" test does not protect the defendant until a suit
has been brought to fruition; thus, knowing that he must risk the expense of
the suit, a publisher may engage in self-censorship. Id. See also R. SACK,
supra note 4; Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved Dilemma, 7 HOFsTRA L. REV. 655, 687-720 (1979).
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may also result if a defendant is put to the expense of a lengthy trial,
have been receptive to defendants' motions for summary judgment on
the issue of "actual malice." 14 In fact, this practice has developed to
the point where some courts have characterized the granting of such
motions as the rule, rather than the exception. 15
More recently, however, the tone of the Supreme Court's decisions
in defamation cases 16 and its criticism of the lower court practice of
granting defendants' summary judgment motions 17 have disconcerted
media law 18 practitioners.1 9 The Court, in footnote nine to its decision
in Hutchinson v. Proxmire,20 stated:
14. See, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29,
32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1013 (1978). For a discussion of Keogh, see notes 84-86 and accompanying text
infra. See also R. SACK, supra note 4, at 537.
15. See, e.g., Oliver v. Village Voice, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the various approaches applied in summary judgment proceedings involving "actual malice,"
see notes 87-107 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 169-70
(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for adopting a restrictive definition of "public figure"); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111,
133 n.16 (1979) (holding open the question whether the standard of actual
malice applies to non-media defendants); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979) (holding that the Constitution does not bar a libel plaintiff from inquiring into the editorial process and the state of mind of those responsible
or the publication). For a discussion of Herbert, see note 74 infra. For a
further discussion of the restrictive approach taken by Wolston, see note 73
infra.
17. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S..ll, 120 n.9 (1979).
18. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "media" includes television, radio, books, newspapers, and magazines. "Media Law" generally concerns itself with the problems unique to publishers and broadcasters, such as
prior restraint, defamation, invasion of privacy, obscenity, federal and state
regulation, and general first amendment issues. See generally 6 MEDIA L.
REP. Topical Index (1980).

19. See 48 U.S.L.W. 2099 (1979) (comments of Floyd Abrams at a seminar
on libel litigation held in New York in July 1979). In paraphrasing one practitioner's lecture, Law Week reported:
The U.S. SuThere is no good news this year in libel law, "....
C reme Court's recent decisions in Hutchinson v. Proxmire . . . and
may not signal the end of
olston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc ....
summary judgments in libel actions against the media . . ." but

libel litigation will now go beyond the constitutional law of libel.
There is a tone and more in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Wolston
that seems very, very, unhappy with the Court's 1962 [sic) decision in
New York Times v. Sullivan ....

We may have larger worries ahead

than when you can get summary judgment.
Id. See also R. SACK, supra note 4, at 582. For a discussion of Hutchinson, see
notes 108-20 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of Wolston, see
note 73 infra.
20. 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979). For a further discussion of footnote nine,
see notes 108-20 and accompanying text infra.
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Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called "rule" of
granting summary judgment in defamation actions involving
"actual malice". The proof of "actual malice" calls a defendant's state of mind into question, and does not lend itself
to summary disposition .... 21
This comment will outline defamation law as it existed before
footnote nine; 22 discuss footnote nine and its effect upon the lower
courts' handling of summary judgment proceedings; 23 and consider
whether the practical result of such handling has been in accord with
24
the apparent intention of this Supreme Court dicta.
II.

BACKGROUND:

DEFAMATION

AND

THE

FIRST AMENDMENT

-

EMERGENCE OF THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD

The problem of reconciling the law of defamation with the protections of the first amendment 25 is one of relatively recent vintage. 26 Prior
to the 1964 United States Supreme Court decision in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,27 defamation was not considered to be within the protections afforded by the first amendment to the freedoms of speech and
of the press.2s

In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,29 for example, the

defendant argued that his first amendment right of free speech had
been abridged when he was arrested for insulting a policeman. 0 In
rejecting that argument, the Court noted that certain "classes" of
speech - such as the "fighting words" used by Chaplinsky 31 - were not
within the protection of the first amendment 32 and went on to note,
33
in dictum, that libelous speech was such an unprotected class.
21. 433 U.S. at 120 n.9.
22. See notes 25-107 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 108-61 and accompanying text infra.
24. See notes 162-86 and accompanying text infra.
25. See note 2 supra.
26. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 819; Berney, Libel and the First Amendment - A New ConstitutionalPrivilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1965).
27. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See generally, Berney, supra note 26; Note,
Privilege to Criticize Public Officials, 78 HARV L. Rvv. 201 (1964); Note,
ConstitutionalLaw - First Amendment Requires Qualified Privilege to Publish
Defamatory Misstatements About Public Officials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284
(1964); Note, Libel - Public Officials - Recovery for Libel of Public Officials
Requires Proof of Actual Malice, 9 VILL. L. REV. 534 (1964).
28. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (dictum).
Cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931) (dictum).
29. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
30. Id. at 570-71.
31. The Court defined "fighting words" as words likely to incite an immediate breach of peace. Id. at 573-74.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 571-72. For other cases recognizing one or more categories of
unprotected speech, see, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
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In what has been described as "unquestionably the greatest victory
won by the defendants in the modern history of torts,"

34

however, the

New York Times Court brought defamatory speech within the first
amendment's protection and announced constitutional limitations upon
the common law right to recover for defamation.3 5 In New York Times,
the Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama brought
suit against the publishers of The New York Times and four civil rights
leaders claiming that an "editorial advertisement" sponsored by the individual defendants and published in the defendant newspaper contained false statements of police abuses and official harassment of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. by Montgomery police.3 6 The plaintiff contended that, as a result of his position, these allegations reflected upon
his personal reputation, and an Alabama jury awarded him $500,000
in damages.3 7 On appeal from the decision of the Alabama Supreme
Court which had affirmed the jury's decision,38 the United States Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the first and fourteenth amendments were inapplicable 39 and reversed the lower court's
decision, holding that those constitutional protections "prohibit a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard whether it was false or not." 40 While Justices Black,
(fighting words); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (criminal libel).
34. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 819.
35. 376 U.S. at 279.
36. Id. at 256-59.
37. Id. at 256.
38. Id. at 289 n.28.
39. Id. at 265-68. The plaintiff made three arguments to avoid the aplication of the fourteenth, and, derivatively, the first, amendments to the
acts of the case: First, the plaintiff contended that no "state action" was involved because the case involved a suit between private parties. Id. at 265.
The Court rejected this argument, reasoning that state action could be found
in the state rules of tort law which restricted the constitutional freedoms of
speech and the press. Id. Second, the plaintiff contended that the first
amendment was inapplicable to commercial speech such as the paid advertisement printed by the newspaper. Id. The Court rejected this claim on the
basis of its belief that this type of "editorial advertisement" was an important

outlet for political speech and could not be relegated to an inferior position

under the first amendment. Id. at 265-66. Third, the plaintiff contended
that defamatory speech was not protected by the first amendment. Id. at 268.
For the Court's resolution of this issue, see notes 40-48 and accompanying text
infra.
40. 376 U.S. at 279-80. In addition to finding a constitutional requirement of a showing of actual malice in cases involving public figures, the Court
rested its result on an alternative ground as well. Id. at 288-92. The Court
held that the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that the defamatory statements were made "of and concerning the plaintiff." Id. at 288. This
ruling was based on the Court's belief that Alabama could not constitutionally
allow general criticism of the government to be transformed into a personal
attack on an individual by "legal alchemy." Id. at 292.
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Goldberg, and Douglas espoused an "absolutist" view of the first amend41
ment under which speech cannot be limited as a result of its content,
thus granting the defendants an "unconditional privilege to criticize
official conduct," 42 Justice Brennan's majority opinion adopted a
balancing approach under which free speech can be subordinated to
an interest of sufficient magnitude. 43 In finding an individual public
official's interest in his reputation to be generally insufficient to warrant
intrusion into protected speech, Justice Brennan noted that an "erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space'
they 'need . . . to survive.' "44

The exception to this general rule,

the Court held, was where the plaintiff could prove with "convincing
clarity" 45 that the statements were made with "actual malice." 46 This
41. Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See Berney, supra note 26, at 37.
42. 376 U.S. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 271-74. See Berney, supra note 26, at 38-39.
44. 376 U.S. at 271-73.
45. Id. at 285-86. The "convincing clarity" test of New York Times has
been equated with the more familiar standard of "clear and convincing" proof.
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). Whether denominated "convincing clarity" or "dear and convincing," this standard is generally described as falling between the normal civil standard of "mere preponderance of the evidence" and the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" in terms of required degree of proof the plaintiff must meet. R. SACK,
supra note 4, at 225. Such proof must be "strong, positive and free from
doubt . . . full, clear and decisive .... ." Stone v. Essex County Newspapers,
Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 871, 330 N.E.2d 161, 175 (1975) (citations omitted). The
convincing clarity test has been described as well suited for state of mind
determinations such as actual malice because it persuades a jury to decide the
issue on the evidence rather than their own predilictions. R. SACK, supra, at
225.
46. 376 U.S. at 279-80. "Actual malice" was the term the Court used to
identify its constitutional standard of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
of falsity. Id. The "actual malice" referred to in New York Times is unrelated to common law malice or ill will, and has become a term of art in
defamation practice. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). See R. SACK, supra note 4, at 211-12. The key ingredient to
"actual malice," - recklessness - was defined in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727 (1968):
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent
man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that
the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for
truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
Id. at 731.
In proving actual malice, the plaintiff cannot rely on mere proof that the
statement was false. Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc.,
84 F.R.D. 682 (D. Mass. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 381 F. Supp. 29, 33 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), af'd, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
The statement must be one of fact and not opinion. Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). But cf. Cianci v. New Times, Inc., 49
U.S.L.W. 2070 (2d Cir. 1980) (imputation of criminal conduct cannot be justified
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actual malice standard, which had its origins in the common law concept of "fair comment" 47 is designed to permit reasonably held opinions
on matters of public concern to be voiced freely without fear of liability while protecting the interests of public officials defamed by intentionally or recklessly false statements which are assumed to be
48
inherently of no useful societal purpose.
The actual malice standard enunciated by the New York Times
Court was there applied to a libel action brought by a public official
against critics of his official conduct. 49 Three years later, the standard
was extended to preclude recovery, absent a showing of actual malice,
by "public figures" - those of general fame and those who seek to
influence public opinion. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,5o the
plaintiff, a college football coach accused in a Saturday Evening Post
article of conspiring to "fix" a game,51 was held to be a public figure
but was found to have met the actual malice standard by showing that
the allegation that he had "fixed" the game was based solely on the
affidavit of one man of questionable veracity.5 2 In Associated Press v.
Walker,53 decided together with Butts,54 the plaintiff, a retired army
officer, based his defamation suit on published reports that he had led
a campus revolt against federal marshalls who were enforcing a desegregation order at the University of Mississippi. 55 In reversing a jury
verdict for the plaintiff, the Court held that due to the fact that there
was little time to prepare the offending story, it could not be said that
the defendants acted with actual malice when they relied on a contributor's first-hand account. 56 The Court's decision in both cases was
based upon its conclusion that because the "views and actions [o]f
as an opinion). The manner in which the defendant researched the statement,
or the editorial process, may be explored. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 176;
Arnheiter v. Random House, Inc., 578 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1978). Often the
defendant's own testimony is critical. See, e.g., Guam Fed'n of Teachers, Local
1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
See also L. ELDREDGE, supra note 4, at 270-71. See generally R. SACK, supra,
at 214-23.
47. R. SACK, supra note 4, at 2; W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 792. See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281.
48. Berney, supra note 26, at 53.
49. 376 U.S. at 279-80.

50. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
51. Id. at 135-37.
52. Id. at 157. justices Black and Douglas dissented on the grounds that
the first amendment prohibits all libel actions against the press. Id. at 170-72
(Black, J., dissenting).

See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.

53. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 140. The plaintiff contended that his participation was limited
to the advocacy of peaceful protest. Id. at 140-41.
56. Id. at 141. A plurality of the Court would have lightened a public
figure's burden by requiring only a showing of "highly unreasonable conduct"
on the part of the defendants. Id. at 155.
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public figures with respect to public issues and events are often of as
much concern to the citizen as the attitudes and behavior of 'public
officials'," 67 events of public concern are of the same constitutional
weight and public figures involved in such events should also be subject
to the actual malice standard. 5s
While the Court initially went so far as to extend the actual
malice standard to all matters of "public or general concern," " in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.60 the Court held that with respect to

plaintiffs who are neither public officials nor public figures, 61 the actual
57. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
58. Id. at 147-48.
160, 162 (1967).

See Note, Libel and Privacy Actions, 81 HARV. L. REV.

59. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality
opinion), overruled, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Rosenbloom concerned a magazine distributor who was arrested for selling materials
which allegedly violated local obscenity laws. 403 U.S. at 32-33. When news
reports of the arrest characterized the distributor as a peddler of smut and filth,
the plaintiff brought an action for libel and prevailed. Id. at 33-35, 40. In
the Supreme Court, the lower court decision was reversed, with a plurality Justices Brennan and Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger - holding that the
first amendment required that the New York Times actual malice standard be
applied to all defamation actions concerning the plaintiff's involvement in
events of "public or general concern." Id. at 52. Justice Black concurred,
maintaining the absolutist view that the first amendment required an absolute
privilege to publish defamation. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring). justice
White, while concurring, would have limited the holding of the plurality to
events involving the official acts of public servants. Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring). See Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming
Newsworthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 371 (1971).
60. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
61. The Walker and Butts cases defined the term "public figure" only
vaguely. Note, supra note 58, at 162. In Gertz, however, the Court more
precisely defined "public figures" as those who
have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society.
Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly,
those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
comment.
418 U.S. at 345.
Thus, there are two classes of public figures: the "all-purpose" public figure
who uniformly must meet the actual malice standard; and the "limited purpose"
public figure, who must meet the standard only with respect to those defamations which relate to his involvement in public dispute. R. SACK, supra note 4,
at 196-97. For examples of public figures under the Gertz definition, see, e.g.,
Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979) (professional football player); Hotchner v. Castillo-Pouche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1978) (writer-friend of Ernest Hemingway);
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978) (children of executed spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper, 417 F. Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1976) (defense
contractor); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., - Ind. App. -, 372
N.E.2d 1211 (1978) (Playboy Magazine "Playmate"). But see Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (plaintiff convicted for contempt for failing to appear before grand jury investigating Soviet espionage
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malice standard did not adequately reflect the increased state interest in
protecting an individual's reputation.62 Applying the balancing approach enunciated in New York Times,6 3 however, the Court held that,
while not requiring application of the actual malice standard in cases
involving private individuals, 64 the first amendment did prohibit the
states from imposing liability on a defendant 65 without fault, 66 from
basing recovery upon presumed damages, 67 or from awarding punitive
damages in the absence of actual malice. 68 The Court's rationale in
thus reinforcing the "public figure/private figure" distinction was twofold: First, public officials and public figures have a greater opportunity
to vindicate their reputations by utilizing their ready access to the
media; 69 and, second, public figures and public officials have accepted
70
the risk of closer public scrutiny by their actions in seeking notoriety.
In Gertz, the Court refused to characterize the plaintiff, a local
attorney who had long been active in community and professional affairs and who was currently engaged in litigation of some public interest,7 ' as a public figure, reasoning that "[i]t is preferable to reduce the
held not a public figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (researcher with government grant not a public figure); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976) (society figure not a public figure).
62. 418 U.S. at 346.
63. See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
64. 418 U.S. at 351. Essentially, a private individual is anyone who cannot
be classed as a public figure or a public official. In Gertz, the plaintiff was a
lawyer who had been active in community affairs. Id. However, the Court
held that this plaintiff was a private individual for defamation purposes because
"he did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." Id. at 352.
See notes 71-73 and accompanying text infra.
65. The majority opinion in Gertz spoke in terms of defendants who are
"publishers or broadcasters." 418 U.S. at 347. This has resulted in controversy
as to whether Gertz applies to defamation cases involving non-media, as well as
media, defendants. See R. SACK, supra note 4, at 261-65; Eaton, The American
Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An
Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1416-18 (1975); Robertson, Defamation
and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX.
L. REV. 199, 215-20,

66. 418 U.S. at 347.
67. Id. at 349-50. The Court required proof of "actual harm inflicted by
defamatory falsehood includ[ing] impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at
350.
In the aftermath of Gertz, it was pointed out that allowing proof of actual
harm by showing mental anguish could be a de facto return to presumed damages. Anderson, supra note 13, at 472-73. However, the Supreme Court has
noted that damages for mental suffering should only be allowed after proof of
some other "actual injury." Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 475 n.3
(1976).
68. Id. at 348-50. See Eaton, supra note 41, at 1432-38; Robertson, supra
note 65, at 230-34.
69. 418 U.S. at 344.
70. Id. at 344-45.
71. Id. at 351-52.
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public figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation." 72 In the case before it,
the Court concluded, the plaintiff "plainly did not thrust himself into
the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." 73

III.

DISCUSSION:

PRACTICING UNDER THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD

A. The Role of Summary Judgment in Actual Malice Cases
Generally, in considering a motion for summary judgment, a court
examines the record 74 in the light most favorable to the non-moving
72. Id. at 352.
73. Id. Generally speaking, the lower courts have given the term public
figure a broad meaning and have applied it liberally in dealing with plaintiffs
who have voluntarily entered the realm of public interest. R. SACK, supra
note 4, at 198. However, with respect to so-called "limited purpose" public
figures, the Supreme Court has suggested a narrower interpretation. See id. at
199-200. In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., the plaintiff, who in 1958
had been convicted of criminal contempt for failure to appear before a grand
jury investigating espionage, was classified as a Soviet agent in a book published
by the defendant. 443 U.S. 157, 159 (1979). The trial court ruled that the
plaintiff was a public figure and granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 160.
On review by the Supreme Court, the judgment was reversed on the
rationale that the plaintiff was not a public figure. Id. at 166. The Court
thought that the plaintiff had not voluntarily thrust himself into the forefront
of any controversy, and that, therefore, under Gertz, he was not a public figure.
Id. at 166-67. According to the Wolston Court, "the mere fact that [the plaintiff] voluntarily chose not to appear before the grand jury, knowing that his
action might be attended by publicity, is not decisive on the question of public
figure status." Id. at 167. The Court further rejected the defendant's contention that any person who engages in criminal conduct becomes a public
figure as to the circumstances surrounding his conviction. Id. at 168.
74. In the context of a summary judgment motion, the record before the
court will consist of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56; PA. R. Civ. P. 1035. Modern
discovery rules allow a party to obtain from any person, even an adverse party,
any non-privileged data relevant to the case. 6 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
56.15[5], at 56-557 (2d ed. 1976). Under existing cases, the defamation
plaintiff can obtain evidence regarding the editorial process and can present
it at the time the defendant makes the motion for summary judgment on the
issue of actual malice. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
Herbert involved a retired army officer, Anthony Herbert, who, during the
Vietnam war, had reported to the media the war crimes of his superiors. Id.
at 155-56. The CBS television network broadcast a report which alleged that
Herbert had fabricated these charges. Id. at 156. Herbert sued for libel and
attempted to depose the producers of the allegedly defamatory program as to
the editorial process that had been followed. Id. at 156-57. The producers
refused to answer questions on this point on first amendment grounds, but
the trial court rejected this claim as a defense. Id. at 157-58. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Id. at 158. On review
by the Supreme Court, the trial judge was affirmed. Id. The Court decided
that it would be unfair to require a plaintiff to prove actual malice and then
take away from him the tools necessary to do so. Id. at 160. Although the
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party, 75 and if no genuine issue of material fact is found, the moving
party is entitled to judgment without having to resort to trial. 76 This
summary remedy thus relieves the litigants of the expense of a costly
trial,7 7 and at the same time reduces the likelihood that a plaintiff can
use a frivolous claim to coerce settlment by threatening to proceed

78
to trial.
Despite a general reluctance to grant summary judgment on issues
which, like actual malice, involve a subjective state-of-mind determination, 79 the granting of summary judgments in favor of defamation
defendants has been described as the rule rather than the exception.8 0

Court recognized that it would be unusual if proof of actual malice came from
the defendant's own mouth, it believed that the direct inquiry into the defendant's state of mind was clearly relevant and could not be denied to the plaintiff.
Id. at 170.
75. See 10 C. WRIGHT 8c A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2727, at 524-28 (1973). The court will construe the evidence in favor of the
party opposing the motion and will give him the benefit of all favorable
inferences which can be drawn. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
76. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 75, § 2711, at 364. See generally Sheehan, Summary Judgment: Let the Movan't Beware, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 253 (1976).
The moving party has the burden of showing that he is
entitled to judgment based on the facts presented and the law applicable to
the particular cause of action. Adickes v. S.H. Kress 8z Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157
(1970); Sheridan v. Garrison, 412 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1969). In a defendant's
motion for summary judgment on the issue of actual malice in a defamation
action, then, the defendant must show that the facts cannot support a finding of
actual malice with convincing clarity. See, e.g., Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588
F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1979); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). The non-movant, however, must make an
affirmative showing that the motion should be denied due to the existence of a
material issue of fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
77. See Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgments Under the Federal Rules When an Issue of Fact is Presented, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (1953).
78. See Weather-Rite Sportswear Co. v. United States Customs Court,
298 F. Supp. 508, 513 (D.D.C. 1969); 10 C. WRIGHT 8c A. MILLER, supra note
75, § 2712, at 370.
79. 10 C. WRIGHT 9c A. MILLER, supra note 75, § 2730, at 583-600. See
Croley v. Matson Navigation Co., 434 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1971). It has been
noted that:
The Court should be cautious in granting a motion for summary
judgment when resolution of the dispositive issue requires a determination of state of mind. Much depends on the credibility of the witnesses testifying as to their own states of mind. In these circumstances the jury should be given an opportunity to observe the
demeanor, during direct and cross-examination, of the witnesses whose
states of mind are at issue.
Id. at 77.
Moreover, to the extent that a determination of someone's subjective
state of mind involves the drawing of inferences as to which reasonable minds
may differ, summary judgment may be inappropriate due to the fact that the
drawing of inferences is traditionally the function of the jury. 10 C. WRIGHT
8cA. MILLER, supra, § 2730, at 583-84.
80. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. One court described the
granting of summary judgments in favor of defamation defendants to be "rooted
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Two explanations for the development of such a rule have been offered.
The first explanation is based on the plaintiff's burdei of showing with
"convincing clarity" that the defendant made the defamatory statement
with actual malice. 8l Since this standard is more rigorous than the
preponderance of the evidence burden of proof applicable in civil cases,
it will be easier for the defendant to demonstrate the appropriateness
of summary judgment.8 2 Secondly, several courts and commentators
have discussed the special need for summary procedures in defamation
cases. 88 Perhaps the leading case articulating this need is Washington
Post v. Keogh.8 4 In Keogh, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed a district court's denial of a newspaper's motion for summary judgment,85 stating:
as deeply as judicial precedents can reach." National Nutritional Foods Ass'n
v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
81. See e.g., Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 557 F.2d 107, 108
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
426 F.2d 858, 866 (5th Cir. 1970); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 573
(5th Cir. 1969); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 449
(S.D. Ga. 1976); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1204-05
(D.D.C. 1975); LeBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 987 (W.D. Mo.
1973); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 50 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1078 (1980). At least one court has rejected the application of the
convincing clarity burden of proof to summary judgments on the rationale
that it is irrelevant to deciding whether "a material fact is controverted in the
context of a genuine issue." Gordon v. Random House, Inc., 486 F.2d 1356,
1363 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 419 U.S. 812 (1974). See Comment,
The Role of Summary Judgment in Political Libel Cases, 53 So. CAL. L. REv.
1783, 1802-04 (1980). See also note 124 infra.
The mandate for the court to apply the actual malice test to the evidence
adduced for summary judgment is found in New York Times where the Court
stated that "we must examine for ourselves the statements in issue and the
circumstances under which they were made to see [whether] the proof presented to show actual malice has the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands." 376 U.S. at 285-86. See Time, Inc. v. McLaney,
406 F.2d at 572; Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. at 1205.
82. See, e.g., Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
83. See, e.g., Grzelak v. Calumet Pub. Co., 543 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir.
1975) (special need to minimize burdens on free speech); Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1971) (summary judgment proper vehicle for
affording constitutional protection); Guitar v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396
F. Supp. 1042, 1053-54 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1975) (because of
importance of free speech summary judgment is the rule); Meeropol v. Nizer,
381 F. Supp. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (summary relief to avoid chilling effect); Anderson,
supra note 67. The special need evolves from the fear that permitting a meritless action to proceed beyond the pleading stage to trial would "chill" publishers in their first amendment rights. Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 975 (D. Minn. 1978). See text accompanying note 86
infra. Cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (chilling effect on free.
dom of association).
84. 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
85. 365 F.2d at 966-67.
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In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are
. . . essential

.

. .

. The threat of being put to the defense of

a lawsuit brought by a popular public official may be as chilling
to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as the fear of
the outcome of the lawsuit itself, especially to advocates of
unpopular causes . . . . Unless persons, including newspapers, . . . are assured freedom from the harassment of law-

suits, they will tend to become self-censors.86
86. Id. at 968. The Keogh court assumed that non-media defendants have
the benefit of the "actual malice" standard. Id.
The combination of this special need for summary disposition with the
heightened standard of proof required for actual malice resulted in the liberal
and frequent granting of summary judgments to defamation defendants. See,
e.g., Southard v. Forbes, Inc., 588 F.2d 140, 145-46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 62 (1979); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 684 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, Inc.,
542 F.2d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 1976); Perry v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.,
499 F.2d 797, 802 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974); Cervantes v.
Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 990-94 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973); Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255, 257 (8th Cir. 1972); Gospel
Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co., 454 F.2d 1050, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 306, 307 (9th Cir. 1971); Miller v. News
Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356, 358 (2d Cir. 1971); Medina v. Time, Inc., 439 F.2d
1129, 1129 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Dacey v. Florida Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d
1292, 1296 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 867 (5th Cir. 1970); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d
565, 571-73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706, 712-14 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969); Walker v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 394
F.2d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 1968); Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394
F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968); Washington Post
Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011
(1967); Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 973, 975 (D.
Minn. 1978), af'd, 602 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1979); Minor v. Lakeview Hosp., 434
F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Wis. 1977), af/'d without opinion, 582 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir.
1978); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 604-05 (D.D.C. 1977),
af'd mem., 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co., 425 F. Supp. 1075, 1084-88 (N.D. Ind. 1976), af/'d, 557 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 961 (D.D.C. 1976), af/'d without opinion, No.
77-1773 (D.C. Cir., May 23, 1978); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp.
1196, 1205 (D.D.C. 1975); Alpine Constr. Co. v. Demaris, 358 F. Supp. 422, 424
(N.D. Ill. 1973); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press, 353 F. Supp. 979, 982-84 (W.D.
Mo. 1973); Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622, 624-26 (W.D. Pa.
1972); Kihneman v. Humble Oil 8c Ref. Co., 312 F. Supp. 34, 44 (E.D. La.
1970); Kinloch v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 314 F. Supp. 602, 606-07 (E.D.N.C.
1969), af'd, 427 F.2d 350 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 905 (1971);
Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (E.D. Pa. 1969), af/'d, 423 F.2d
887 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970); Marsh v. Commercial & Say.
Bank, 265 F. Supp. 614, 621-23 (W.D. Va. 1967); Woolbright v. Sun Communications, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. 1972); Cline v. Brown, 24 N.C. App.
209, 215-16, 210 S.E.2d 446, 449-50 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d
793 (1975); Barbetta Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Publishing Co., 135 N.J.
Super. 214, 223, 343 A.2d 105, 110 (1975); Trails West, Inc. v. Wolff, 32 N.Y.2d
207, 218-20, 298 N.E.2d 52, 60, 344 N.Y.S.2d 863, 873-74 (1973); Washington v.
World Publishing Co., 506 P.2d 913, 915-17 (Okla. 1973).
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B. Various Articulations of the Standards for Granting
Summary Judgment
Given the widespread practice of granting summary judgment in
actual malice defamation cases, three articulations of the courts' role
87
in ruling on such motions have developed.
One articulation is found in Judge Skelly Wright's concurring
opinion in Wasserman v. Time, Inc.88 There, Judge Wright discussed
the procedure a trial court should follow in ruling on summary judgment and directed verdict motions involving the issue of actual malice.8 9
According to Judge Wright, special judicial involvement in the consideration of these motions is warranted by the first amendment.90 In
reviewing the evidence, the trial judge is to personally draw reasonable
87. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 45-48 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1078 (1980). For a discussion of Nader, see notes 125-37 and accompanying text infra. Several commentators continue to discuss the issue in terms
of two rather than three standards. See, e.g., Warren, Libel - Some Thoughts

for the Defense, 6

LITIGATION

12, 16 (1980); Comment, The Use of Summary

Judgments in Defamation Cases, 14 U.S.F. L. Ry. 77, 92-99 (1980); Comment,

supra note 81, at 1801.
88. 424 F.2d 920, 922-23 (D.C. Cir.) (Wright, J., concurring), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 940 (1970).

In Wasserman, the Court of Appeals reversed a summary

judgment in favor of, the defendant, basing its decision on the fact that undisputed evidence existed that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was an attorney for, and not a member of, a group slated to appear before a grand jury
investigating organized crime, but placed plaintiff in the same category in an
article. 424 F.2d at 921-22. judge Wright agreed with the decision of the
majority, but concurred in order to set forth what he considered to be the
proper procedure for a trial court to follow in actual malice cases. Id. at 922
(Wright, J., concurring). See note 89 infra.
89. 424 F.2d at 922-23 (Wright, J., concurring).

Judge Wright stated:

In my judgment New York Times v. Sullivan makes actual malice
a constitutional issue to be decided in the first instance by the trial
judge applying the Times test of actual knowledge or reckless disregard
of the truth. Unless the court finds, on the basis of pre-trial affidavits,
depositions or other documentary evidence, that the plaintiff can prove
actual malice in the Times sense, it should grant summary judgment
for the defendant.
If the case survives the defendant's summary judgment motion, the
trial court at the close of the plaintiff's case must decide whether
actual malice has been shown with "convincing clarity." In making
this judgment the court will judge the credibility of the witnesses and
draw its own inferences from the evidence . . . . If the motion for
directed verdict . . . is denied, the actual malice issue . . . is then
submitted to the jury under the Times instruction . ...
This two-step procedure in which both the trial judge and the
jury must find actual malice before there can be judgment for the
plaintiff provides the protection of the First Amendment freedom that
Times sought to make secure . ...
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
90. Id.

See Comment, supra note 81, at 1804.
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inferences and weight credibility 91 in making a decision as to whether
92
actual malice could be found with convincing clarity.
The second approach to summary judgment was articulated in
Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael.9 3 In Guam, the
Ninth Circuit expressly rejected Judge Wright's assignment to the trial
judge 94 of the role of fact finder, and approved a standard in accord
91. 424 F.2d at 922-23 (Wright, J., concurring). A close reading of Judge
Wright's opinion suggests that the special judicial involvement would apply
only to motions for directed verdicts. See id.; Comment, supra note 81, at
1806. However, some courts have read the opinion as suggesting the special
procedure for summary judgments as well. See, e.g., Nader v. de Toledano,
408 A.2d 31, 45-46 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980) (disapproving the special procedure); Guam Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael,
492 F.2d 438, 440 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974) (disapproving the
special procedure). The courts which have cited Wasserman with approval
have generally rejected any suggestion that the court is to follow anything
other than normal summary judgment procedures. See, e.g., Bon Air Hotel,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1970) (evidence is to be viewed
in the light most favorable to non-moving party); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 954 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd without
opinion, No. 77-1773 (D.C. Cir., May 23, 1978); Oliver v. Village Voice, Inc.,
417 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F.
Supp. 1196, 1205 (D.D.C. 1975). Cf. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206,
213 n.15 (7th Cir. 1976) (reserving the question as to whether the trial judge
can draw inferences and determine credibility). But cf. Fadell v. Minneapolis
Star & Tribune Co., Inc., 557 F.2d 107, 108 (7th Cir. 1977) (apparently following the special procedure of Wasserman).
92. 424 F.2d at 922-23 (Wright, J., concurring). The courts which follow
Wasserman have applied the convincing clarity standard to the evidence adduced at summary judgment. See, e.g., Fadell v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co., Inc., 557 F.2d 107, 108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977);
Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1204-05 (D.D.C. 1975).
93. 492 F.2d 438 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974). In Guam, a
teachers' union brought a libel action against a school hoard member who had
made uncomplimentary remarks about the union in a local newspaper. 492
F.2d at 438. In reviewing the grant of a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, the court reversed, concluding that the plaintiff's evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable
jury to find actual malice with convincing clarity. Id. The trial judge had
expressly indicated that he was drawing inferences and weighing credibility in
reliance on Judge Wright's opinion in Wasserman. Id. at 439-40. For a discussion of Wasserman, see notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
94. 492 F.2d at 440-41. Although the case before it involved a motion for
a directed verdict, the Guam rationale extended to summary judgments as
well. Id. at 441. The court stated:
We think that in a libel case, as in other cases, the party against
whom a motion for summary judgment, [or] a motion for directed
verdict . . . is made is entitled to have the evidence viewed in the

light most favorable to him and to all inferences that can properly
be drawn in his favor by the trier of fact. We think, too, that in such
cases it is not . . . the duty of the judge, or this court of appeal, to

weigh the credibility of the evidence, or to draw inferences in favor
of the moving party .

...

Id. In rejecting Wright's approach, the Guam court noted that the suggestion
that a judge should determine the credibility of the evidence was dicta, and
that subsequent cases had not followed the suggestion. Id. The Guam court,
nonetheless, agreed with Wasserman that "special care is appropriate" at the
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with normal summary judgment procedures 95 under which the trial
court is to review the evidence to determine whether the plaintiff has
presented facts which create a jury question on the issue of actual
malice. 96 The Guam court did recognize the burden on the plaintiff to
demonstrate with convincing clarity that the statement was made with
actual malice; 97 a plaintiff unable to make such a showing will be
98
vulnerable to a summary judgment motion.
A third type of summary judgment practice has been tentatively
identified 99 as existing in the state courts of Colorado,100 Washington,'01
summary judgment level in order to avoid a chilling on first amendment rights.
Id. at 441. This care, however, was limited to closely scrutinizing the evidence
to determine whether summary judgment should be granted. Id.
95. Id. at 441. The court stated:
The standard against which the evidence must be examined is that of
New York Times and its progeny. But the manner in which the evidence is to be examined in the light of that standard is the same as in
all other cases in which it is claimed that a case should not go to
the jury.
Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Id. For cases applying the normal procedures for summary judgment
to defamation actions, see, e.g., Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 441 F.2d 378,
379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d
219, 221 (5th Cir. 1970); Hochner v. Castillo-Pouche, 404 F. Supp. 1041, 1050
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), all'd, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834
(1978); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., -

Ind. App.

-,

-,

372

N.E.2d 1211, 1222-23 (1978). Cf. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459, 464
(9th Cir. 1978) (applying the normal procedures for judgment n.o.v. and
directed verdict to a defamation action); Holter v. WLCY-TV, Inc., 366 So. 2d
445, 447 (Fla. App. 1978) (directed verdict).
97. 492 F.2d at 441. The Guam court would have a trial court examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to see whether actual
malice could be shown with convincing clarity. Id.
98. See id.
99. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1078 (1980). The court considered this third view to be distinct from
the other two, but labelled it the "functional equivalent" of the Guam standard.
Id. at 47-48.
100. DiLeo v. Koltonow, - Colo. -, 613 P.2d 318 (1980). DiLeo involved
an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Id.
at -, 613 P.2d at 320. The plaintiff, a police officer who had been fired and
was seeking re-instatement, considered a newspaper account of his official conduct to be defamatory. Id. The DiLeo court, after concluding that the plaintiff was a public figure for the purpose of controversy over his rehiring, next
considered whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment. Id.
at -, 613 P.2d at 321-23. The court ruled that the convincing clarity test
applied at the summary judgment stage. Id. at -, 613 P.2d at 323. On the
merits, the court noted that the defendants, according to the record adduced
for summary judgment, had published in reliance on competent sources and
after a corroborating investigation. Id. at -, 613 P.2d at 324. The plaintiff,
on the other hand, had produced no evidence of actual malice. Id. Thus, the
DiLeo court upheld the grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
101. Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d 37, 515 P.2d 154 (1973).
In Chase, the plaintiff was a port commissioner who had allegedly received
public funds for a business trip he had not taken. Id. at 38, 515 P.2d at 155.
When the plaintiff learned that a local newspaper planned to publish this
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and Wyoming. 102
Under this test, as stated in Chase v. Daily
Record, Inc., 0o courts judge summary judgment motions according to
whether the plaintiff has presented a prima facia case 104 sufficient to
meet their burden under the convincing clarity test. 105 It is questionable, however, whether the Chase articulation is in substance any different from the Guam standard, 106 since both tests recognize that
meeting the convincing clarity burden of proof is necessary for the plain107
tiff's cause of action.
story, he called the paper to make a statement. Id. The paper printed the
story and part of the plaintiff's statement, leaving out his assertion that he had
not received any public money. Id. Chase sued the newspaper for libel and
the newspaper was granted summary judgment. Id. at 40, 515 P.2d at 156.
After finding the plaintiff to be a public official under New York Times the
Chase court turned to a consideration of proper summary judgment procedure
in defamation actions involving actual malice. Id. at 42-43, 515 P.2d at 156-57.
The court stated:
[I]n such defamation actions, if the trial judge at the summary judgment stage determines that the plaintiff has offered evidence of a
sufficient quantum to establish a prima facie case, and the offered evidence can be equated with the standard or test of "convincing clarity"
prescribed by United States Supreme Court decisions, the motion for
summary judgment should be denied.
Id. at 43, 515 P.2d at 157-58 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). On the
facts, the court found that the defendant knowingly made a false statement
about the plaintiff and reversed the grant of summary judgment. Id. at 45,
515 P.2d at 158.
102. Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976). In
Adams, a defamation action was brought against a radio station which failed
to use a tape delay system in connection with a talk show during the course of
which the plaintiff, a local politician, was defamed. Id. at 558. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant. Id. The Adams court found
that the facts of the case were undisputed and that, as a matter of law, the
failure to use a tape delay did not constitute actual malice. Id. at 562-67.
Therefore, the trial court was affirmed. Id. at 567. The Adams court quoted
with approval the prima facie case test of Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash.
2d 37, 43, 515 P.2d 154, 157-58 (1973). 555 P.2d at 562.
103. 83 Wash. 2d 37, 515 P.2d 154 (1973).
104. Id. For a discussion of Chase, see note 101 supra. While the Chase
court did not define a prima facie case, another court, in explaining Chase,
defined a prima facie case as one which, if uncontradicted, would allow a plaintiff to prevail. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 48 (D.C. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
105. 83 Wash. 2d at 44-45, 515 P.2d at 157-58. See note 101 supra.
106. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 32, 49 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1073 (1980). In equating the two, the Nader court reasoned that
Chase's prima facie case test - that quantity of proof which, if believed, would
permit judgment in one party's favor unless contradicted by evidence offered
by the opposing party - is the same as the normal summary judgment procedure which was followed in Guam. 408 A.2d at 49. The Guam test focuses
on how the evidence is to be viewed, while the Chase test focuses on the weight
the evidence must attain after it is viewed. In that the Chase court indicated
that the summary judgment procedure is basically the same, it too would view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See note 101 supra.
107. Compare Guam Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d at
441 (whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
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C. Hutchinson v. Proxmire: The Supreme Court Disapproves of
the Liberal Granting of Summary Judgment
In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,108 the United States Supreme Court
reviewed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Senator William
Proxmire, who, in the course of announcing his "Golden Fleece" award,
had allegedly defamed a federally funded research scientist. 109 The
defamatory statement was made during a speech in Congress and was
subsequently released in full to the press."10 The trial court, considering the statements to be privileged under a combination of the Speech
or Debate clause,"' the New York Times standard, 1 2 and the state
law right of fair comment, 1 3 granted the defendant summary judgment." 4 The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the constitutional grounds."15
nonmovant, established actual malice with convincing clarity) with Chase v.
Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wash. 2d at 43, 515 P.2d at 157 (whether the evidence
is of sufficient quantum to establish a prima facie case and can be equated with
the test of convincing clarity).
108. 443 U.S. 111 (1979). Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority opinion
in which all but Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 113.
109. Id. at 114-17. Senator Proxmire created the "award" to publicize
outrageous examples of wasteful government spending. Id. at 114. The plaintiff, Ronald Hutchinson, had conducted studies of the emotional behavior in
certain animals when subjected to stress. Id. at 115. Both the Navy and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration funded this research in order
to ascertain problems associated with confining humans in close quarters for
long periods of time. Id. Proxmire, in part, charged that Hutchinson had
"made a fortune from his . . . [studies] and in the process made a monkey out
of the American taxpayer." Id. at 116.
110. Id. at 115-16. In addition to the Senate speech, Senator Proxmire
sent out press releases to the media and sent copies to about 100,000 people
in a newsletter. Id. at 115-17. He also repeated the statements on a television interview. Id.
111. 431 F. Supp. 1311 (W.D. Wis. 1977), remanded, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th
Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). The Speech or Debate clause provides:
"[f]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators or Representatives]
shall not be questioned in any other place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
The trial court considered all actions within the legislative role to be protected by this clause. 431 F. Supp. at 1320-21. On this basis, the court held
that both the speech itself and the press releases were protected. Id. at 1325.
112. 431 F. Supp. at 1311. The court held that the plaintiff was both a
public figure and a public official due to his position as a government researcher. Id. at 1325-28.
113. Id. at 1330-32. For a discussion of fair comment, see note 47 and
accompanying text supra.
114. 431 F. Supp. at 1333. The trial court followed the normal summary
judgment procedure espoused by Guam. Id. at 1330. However, the court, in
determining whether a showing of actual malice had been made, stated that
"in making this determination, the granting of summary judgment may well
be the 'rule' rather than the 'exception.'" Id.
115. 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 111 (1979). The Court
of Appeals held that the speech, the press releases, and the newsletters were
protected by the Speech or Debate clause. 579 F.2d at 1031-34.
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0
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 11 holding that some of
the statements were not immune under the Speech or Debate clause 117
and that, since the plantiff was not a public figure, the actual malice
118
standard did not apply to the remainder of the statements.
Discussing the trial court's observation that summary judgment
might be the rule rather than the exception in actual malice defamation cases, the Hutchinson Court, in footnote nine, rebuked the trial
court by questioning the propriety of summary judgments in cases involving issues of state of mind. 119 However, the Court noted that the
question was not presented by the facts of the case, and did not pursue
120
the issue.

D. Summary Judgments after Hutchinson
12
While footnote nine was not necessary to the Court's holding, '
the Court's view of the lower courts' propensity to grant summary judgments was clear. 122 However, since the footnote dealt with the subject

116. 443 U.S. at 114. Since the Court of Appeals had not considered
the state law ground of the privilege of fair comment, the cause was remanded.
See 579 F.2d at 1029.
117. 443 U.S. at 123-33. The Court ruled that while the speech itself
would be absolutely immune, neither the press releases nor the newsletters were
essential to the functioning of the Senate. The latter material, therefore,
was not protected. Id. at 130-33. Justice Brennan, dissenting, would have
held the newsletters and press releases immune. Id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 133-36. The Court relied on Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979), in determining that the plaintiff was not a public
figure. 443 U.S. at 135. For a discussion of Wolston, see note 73 supra. The
Court reasoned that Hutchinson had not thrust himself into the forefront of
any public controversy since his publications were known to only a small
group of scientists. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that he had come into
the public eye only through Proxmire's own misconduct in publicizing the
award. 443 U.S. at 135-36.
119. 443 U.S. at 120 & n.9. For the text of footnote nine, see text accompanying note 21 supra.
120. 443 U.S. at 120 & n.9. The Court phrased the issue as one concerning the appropriateness of summary judgment, arising from the trial court's
view that "solicitude for the First Amendment required a more hospitable
judicial attitude toward granting summary judgment in a libel case." Id. at
122.
121. See id. at 120 n.9. For a case in which apparent dicta in a footnote
later assumed great precedential value, see United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting closer scrutiny of the constitutionality of statutes which prejudice "discrete and insular minorities"). Compare Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-91 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 934 (1973) (criticising the doctrine of Carolene Products) with Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1059 (1974) (supporting the doctrine).
122. See, e.g., Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc..
619 F.2d 932, 939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 117 (1980) ("The Chief
Justice's opinion in Hutchinson not only states 'doubt' about the supposed
.rule' [supporting summary judgment], but takes almost the opposite position").
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only briefly, and explicitly refrained from addressing the merits, 12
later courts were given no guidance as to what, specifically, was being
disapproved. Nonetheless, courts considering post-Hutchinson defamation actions have been quick to adopt the footnote as authority.124
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Nader v. de Toledano,12 5 viewed the Hutchinson footnote as casting doubt upon Judge
Wright's suggestion that the trial judge make a personal appraisal of
the evidence. 126 After setting forth what it considered to be the three
pre-Hutchinson articulations of when summary judgment should be
granted, 127 the Nader court opined that footnote nine required that
128
normal procedures be applied to summary judgment proceedings.
Reasoning that Judge Wright's standard improperly allowed a judge
to assess the credibility of witnesses and, thereby, to usurp the role
123. 443 U.S. at 120 n.9. The Court stated that "[iln the present posture
of the case, however, the propriety of dealing with such complex issues by
summary judgment is not before us." Id.
124. See notes 125-53 and accompanying text infra. A few courts have
considered footnote nine to be almost a bar to the granting of summary judgment. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 84
F.R.D. 682, 685 (D. Mass. 1980) (summary judgment inappropriate on subjective state of mind issue); American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 375 So.
2d 239, 249 (Ala. 1980) ("convincing clarity" does not apply at the summary
judgment stage); Hall v. Piedmont Pub. Co., - N.C. App. -, 266 S.E.2d 397
(1980) (summary judgment inappropriate on subjective state of mind issue).
See also Church of Scientology v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
In denying a summary judgment motion, the Siegelman court stated:
The plaintiffs have alleged that the defamatory remarks were made
with actual malice and that therefore the New York Times standard
has been met. While the supporting material submitted as to this
point is far from convincing, the plaintiffs have managed to place the
defendant's state of mind into question, and, in view of the Supreme
Court's statement in Proxmire, the Court does not believe it appropriate to grant summary judgment at this time.
Id. at 955 (emphasis added).
125. 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. App. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
Consumer advocate Ralph Nader brought a libel action against a newspaper
and its columnist who wrote an article asserting that Nader had "falsified and
distorted" evidence presented to a Senate committee investigating the safety
of General Motors' Corvair automobile. Id. at 35-38. Summary judgment
was granted to the defendants on the grounds that Nader could not prove
actual malice with convincing clarity. Id. at 38.
126. 408 A.2d at 49. The Nader court stated: "We are unpersuaded by
Judge Wright's . . . approach .

. .

. [I]t impermissively denigrates the tradi-

tional roles of judge and jury. Furthermore, we glean from the New York
Times and [Hutchinson] decisions . . . that the Court envisions normal function of the jury in libel actions ......
Id. (citations omitted). For a further
discussion of Judge Wright's approach, see notes 88-92 and accompanying text
supra.

127. 408 A.2d at 45-49. The Nader court identified the Wasserman,
Guam, and Chase articulations. Id. For a discussion of these articulations,
see notes 88-107 and accompanying text supra.
128. 408 A.2d at 49.
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of the jury, 129 the Nader court held that the proper test was that
stated in Guam: 180 "[T]he plaintiff need only present evidence which

shows a genuine issue of material fact from which a reasonable jury
could find actual malice with convincing clarity." 181 In the case before it, believing the trial judge to have determined the credibility of
the evidence in reliance on Judge Wright's standard, 132 the Nader court
reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant. 138
Similarly, the Nader dissent viewed Judge Wright's standard as one
which had been thoroughly discredited by other courts 184 and con129. Id. The Nader court viewed Judge Wright's approach as a departure
from normal summary judgment procedures in two ways: 1) the evidence is
viewed by the trial judge in its most reasonable light, rather than the light
most favorable to the non-movant, and 2) the trial judge personally determines
whether actual malice can be proven with convincing clarity, rather than
determining whether a reasonable jury could so find. Id. at 46.
130. Id. at 49. For a discussion of the Guam approach, see notes 93-98

and accompanying text supra.
131. 408 A.2d at 49 (emphasis in original). While the Nader court thought
that summary judgment was an important stage of libel litigation, it disagreed
with any "skewing of the roles of judge and jury," and therefore applied the
normal procedures for summary judgment. Id. at 49-50.

132. Id. at 44. The trial judge, while viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, had, in the Nader court's view, ruled that the

trial judge himself must be satisfied that actual malice had been proven with
convincing clarity. Id. The Nader court agreed with the plaintiff's contention that the trial judge's view impermissibly required the plaintiff to prove
actual malice twice, once to the judge and once to the jury. Id.
133. Id. at 54. The rationale for the reversal was based on the fact that
the Senate committee to which Nader reported had characterized his charges
as made in good faith, albeit unfounded. Id. at 50-53. According to the court,
the columnist, in writing that Nader had falsified his evidence, deliberately
overlooked this good faith finding. Id. at 53. Under these circumstances, the
court believed that a reasonable jury could find actual malice with convincing
clarity. Id. at 53-54.
The Nader court, however, affirmed the summary judgment with respect to
the defendant newspaper, reasoning that in relying on the expertise of the
columnist without undertaking a corroborative investigation, the newspaper
could be found to have been only negligent. Id. at 54-58. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find actual malice with convincing clarity. Id. at 58.
134. Id. at 60 (Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Harris read judge Wright's opinion in Wasserman as suggesting two things:
1) that the convincing clarity burden of proof be applied at the summary
judgment stage, and 2) that in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the
trial judge should make a persopal appraisal of the weight of the evidence.
Id. Thus, in Judge Harris' view, Judge Wright had correctly espoused the

approach to be taken as to summary judgment and had only issued harmless
dicta as to the approach on a directed verdict motion. Id. See Brophy v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., - Pa. Super. Ct. -, -, 422 A.2d 625, 634-42
(1980) (Spaeth, J., concurring). For a discussion of Brophy, see notes 153-61
and accompanying text infra. Moreover, Judge Harris pointed out, the courts

were uniform in applying the convincing clarity standard at the summary
judgment stage and in rejecting any suggestion that a trial judge personally
appraise evidence in determining motions for summary judgment. 408 A.2d at
60 (Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See, e.g., Fadell v.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 557 F.2d 107, 108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 996 (1977); Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
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sidered the Guam standard to be the majority rule. 3 5 Accusing the
majority of creating a false conflict in the law in order to justify its
decision, 36 however, the dissent maintained that the lower court had
8 7
properly used the Guam standard.
Nevertheless, recent decisions have cited Nader with approval.38
In National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Central
Broadcasting Corp.,3 9 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed a lower court's denial of the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and entered instead a judgment for the defendant. 140 Aldenied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519 F.2d
777, 780 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975); Guam Fed'n of Teachers,
Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872
(1974); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1970);
Goldwater v. Ginzberg, 414 F.2d 324, 337-40 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1049 (1970); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 572-73 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431 F. Supp. 1311, 1328,
1330 (W.D. Wis. 1977), afj'd, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196,
1204-05 (D.D.C. 1975); Kent v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 349 F. Supp. 622 (W.D.
Pa. 1972).
135. 408 A.2d at 59-63 (Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Harris believed the proper inquiry to be whether a reasonable
jury could find actual malice with convincing clarity. Id. at 60 (Harris, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, while "[s]ome courts
have been more explicit than others in setting forth the appropriate standard,
• . . by no means can it accurately be said that there are alternative approaches abroad in the land." Id.
136. Id. at 60-61 (Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("In my view, the majority creates a nonexistent debate ....
).
137. Id. at 63 (Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Harris would have affirmed both grants of summary judgment. Id. at 67
(Harris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. See notes 139-61 and accompanying text infra.
139. - Mass. -, 396 N.E.2d 996 (1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1980).
The case involved a controversy over the approval of a police collective bargaining agreement. - Mass. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 998. The police union had
warned the chairman of the local board of selectmen not to speak against the
agreement since it had been approved by a majority of the selectmen. Id. The
chairman phoned in to a radio talk show and objected to the union's attempt
to limit his freedom of speech, calling it an "inroad of communism." Id. at
-, 396 N.E.2d at 999. The talk show host agreed with the chairman, an act
which, according to the union, indicated the radio stations' adoption of the
charge of communism. Id. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 999. The union then sued the
station for libel. Id. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 997-98. When the station's motion
for summary judgment was denied, the station appealed. Id.
140. Id. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 998. The court indicated three separate
grounds for reversal. Id. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 1000. First, the statement of the
chairman of the selectmen consisted of an accurate factual assertion followed
by an opinion and, as such, was fully protected by the first amendment. Id.,
quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339-40 ("Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction . . . on the competition of
other ideas"). Second, the allegation of "communism" was not defamatory in
that a reasonable listener would have understood the allegation as "mere
pejorative rhetoric." - Mass. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 1001-02. Third, the court
held that there was no genuine issue of fact as to actual malice. Id. at -, 396
N.E.2d at 1002-03.
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though the court acknowledged the Hutchinson footnote, 14' it concluded that footnote nine
does not mean that a party against whom summary judgment is
sought is entitled to a trial simply because he has asserted a
cause of action to which state of mind is a material element.
There must be some indication that he can produce the requisite quantum of evidence to enable him to reach the jury with
42
his claim.
Recognizing that Nader had pointed out that Judge Wright's procedural measure for summary judgment constituted "less than the customary demanding standard," 143 the Central Broadcasting court applied the Nader standard which requires the plaintiff to present evidence
which would enable a jury to find "actual malice" with convincing
clarity. 4 4 The court noted that, although the plaintiff had had the
full use of discovery techniques to adduce proof of recklessness, 4 5 the
evidence presented was insufficient to allow the requisite finding.14 6
Similarly, in Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.,14 7 the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court grant of summary

judgment for the defendant. 48 Citing Nader for the proposition that
normal summary judgment procedures applied,' 49 the Yiamouyiannis
court concluded that the summary judgment was proper because "no
141. - Mass. at -, 396 N.E.2d at

1003.

142. Id.
143. Id. at - n.13, 396 N.E.2d at 1003 n.13.
144. Id. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 1002-03. According to Central Broadcasting,
in order for the defendant to succeed on a motion for summary judgment he
must establish that "in the evidence brought forward, considered with an in•dulgence in the plaintiff's favor, a jury could not reasonably conclude that the
plaintiff had shouldered and carried the burden" of proving actual malice with
convincing clarity. Id. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 1003.
145. Id. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 1004. The court noted that "the plaintiff,
having available to it the instruments of pretrial discovery to seek out proof
of the crucial state of mind, . . . made no effort . . . to depose [defendant's
agent] or others who might have information." Id., citing Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153 (1979). For a discussion of Herbert, see note 74 supra.
146. - Mass. at -, 396 N.E.2d at 1003-04. In so doing, the court found
the plaintiff's evidence to be insufficient in that it relied merely on an allega•tion of hostility and also that it lacked the usual basis for inferring a guilty
state of mind, i.e., that the statement was fabricated, based on unsubstantiated
rumor, or inherently improbable. Id.
147. 619 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 117 (1980). The plaintiff alleged that his professional reputation as a research scientist was injured by
a Consumer Reports article which claimed that "the overwhelming weight of
scientific evidence" was contrary to the plaintiff's findings on the danger of
fluoridating water supplies. 619 F.2d at 933-35.
148. 619 F.2d at 942.

149. Id. at 940. The court reaffirmed that "[d]efamation actions are, for
procedural purposes, such as discovery, or for summary judgment, to be treated
no differently from other actions; any 'chilling effect' caused by the defense of
the lawsuit itself, is simply to be disregarded ....... .Id.
(citations omitted).
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reasonable jury could find with convincing clarity" that the defendant
had "acted with actual malice." 150 As in Central Broadcasting,'5 ' the
Yiamouyiannis court considered the availability of discovery to eliminate
15 2
the state of mind problem noted in footnote nine.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Brophy xi.Philadelphia
Newspapers, InC., 15 3 considered the effect of footnote nine 154 in affirming a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 155 The lead
opinion 156 in Brophy rejected the defendant's argument that Pennsylvania courts had adopted Judge Wright's approach, 157 and chose to
follow the approach of both Guam and Nader.158
150.

Id.

151. See notes 139-46 and accompanying text supra.
152. 619 F.2d at 940.

153. - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 422 A.2d 625 (1980). Brophy involved the shooting of a youth by local police while the former was attempting an armed
robbery. Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 627-28. Because the youth was the son of the
local Chief of Police and the chief had had a running feud with the Police
Commissioner, who was involved in the shooting, the Philadelphia Inquirer
reported that some of the townspeople thought the shooting might have been
intentional. Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 628. The Police Commissioner sued the
newspaper for libel. Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 627.
154. Compare id. at -, 422 A.2d at 630-31 (Judge Cavanaugh's view) with
id. at -, 422 A.2d at 634-35 (Spaeth, J., concurring) (Judge Spaeth's view).
155. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 634.
156. The case was heard by Judges Cavanaugh, Spaeth, and Hester. The
lead opinion in Brophy was written by Judge Cavanaugh. Judge Spaeth concurred in the result. Judge Hester dissented, believing there to be a genuine
issue of fact from which a jury could find actual malice. Id. at -, 422 A.2d
at 642 (Hester, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 630-31. The plaintiff argued that an opinion
written by Judge Spaeth had adopted Judge Wright's approach requiring a
judicial appraisal of the evidence. Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 630, citing Curran v.
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 118, 395 A.2d 1342 (1978).
In Curran, Judge Spaeth observed that summary judgment in defamation
cases was a "preferred procedure." 261 Pa. Super. Ct. at 126, 395 A.2d at 1346.
Judge Spaeth also stated in Curran that
the court must on a motion for summary judgment make a threshold
inquiry into actual malice: Unless the court finds on the basis of pretrial affidavits, depositions, and documentary evidence that the plaintiff can prove actual malice in the New York Times sense, it should
grant summary judgment for the defendant. It is not enough for the
plaintiff, in resisting summary judgment, to argue that there is a jury
question as to malice; he must make a showing of facts from which
malice may be inferred. Such an inference must be clear.
Id. at 129-30, 395 A.2d at 1348, citing Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d at
922 (Wright, J., concurring).
In Brophy, Judge Cavanaugh read Judge Spaeth's Curran opinion as
adopting Judge Wright's approach. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 630-31.
However, since Curran was affirmed by an equally divided court, Judge Cav-

anaugh considered Curran to be of no precedential value.
at -, 422 A.2d at 631.
158. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 631-32.
Guam and Nader, Judge Cavanaugh stated:

- Pa. Super. Ct.

After quoting from both

We find the rationale expressed by these courts persuasive and
hold that a trial court confronted with a motion for summary judg-
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A concurring opinion by Judge Spaeth argued that Judge Wright's
articulation contemplated the application of normal summary judgment procedures. 159 The preference for summary judgment arising out
of the pre-Hutchinson cases was, in Judge Spaeth's view, a product of
the "convincing clarity" burden of proof placed upon plaintiffs in
actual malice defamation cases. 160 In considering footnote nine, Judge
Spaeth remarked:
I regard the effect of this footnote as speculative at best. The
footnote did not articulate what "doubt" was felt, nor why,
nor what different rule should be applied; it expressly stated
that the issues involved in deciding upon a different rule were
not before the court. For me, it would take much more than
such a footnote to "cast in doubt" either the "vitality" of the
cases or the power of the considerations that I have discussed.' 0 '
ment in a public official or figure defamation case may deny. the
motion if, viewing all the evidence and all the inferences arising
therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there appears a
genuine issue of fact from which a jury could reasonably find actual
malice with convincing clarity.
Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 632.

Judge Cavanaugh rejected Judge Spaeth's opinion in Curran v. Philadel.
phia New.spapers, Inc., 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 118, 395 A.2d 1342 (1978), arguing
that it espoused a view which differed from normal summary judgment procedure in that: 1) the trial judge is not required to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, and 2) the trial judge must be
personally satisfied that actual malice can be shown with convincing clarity.
- Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 632. For a discussion of Nader, see notes
125-37 and accompanying text supra.
Turning to the facts, Judge Cavanaugh affirmed the grant of summary
judgment, believing that the allegedly defamatory article did not purport to
reveal the facts, but only local opinion as to the events leading up to the
shooting. Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 633-34.

159. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 634-35 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
Judge Spaeth argued that the view he adopted in Curran v. PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc., 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 118, 395 A.2d 1342 (1978), did not suffer from
its citation to Judge Wright's Wasserman opinion.

- Pa. Super Ct. at -, 422

A.2d at 634-35 (Spaeth, J., concurring). In Judge Spaeth's view, both his
Curran opinion and Wasserman required the evidence presented to be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. For a discussion of Curran,
see note 157 supra.

160. - Pa. Super Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 635-36 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
According to Judge Spaeth, his statement in Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 261 Pa. Super. Ct. 118, 395 A.2d 1342 (1978), that summary
judgment is a "preferred procedure" in defamation cases was a correct statement of the law. - Pa. Super Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 635-36 (Spaeth, J., concurring). While the manner in which the trial judge is to examine the evidence is the same as in other cases, the evidence so viewed, must be clear and
convincing that actual malice can be shown. Id. at -, 422 A.2d at 637
(Spaeth, J., concurring).
161. - Pa. Super. Ct. at -, 422 A.2d at 637 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
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IV.

ANALYSIS

AND CONCLUSIONS

Prior to Hutchinson, trial judges had frequently granted motions
for summary judgment on the issue of actual malice 162 to media defendants.1 63 Hutchinson footnote nine, however, cast doubt upon this
practice.' 64 The post-Hutchinson courts appear to have taken up the
Nader approach as they attempt to reconcile footnote nine with prior
case law. 165 Under Nader, the trial judge must view the record in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether a reasonable
jury could have found actual malice with convincing clarity.166
It is submitted, however, that the Nader rule represents no substantial change from the prior case law. 167 Few courts have actually
followed Judge Wright's approach of judicial weighing of the evi162. See note 60 supra.
163. The Supreme Court has recently pointed out that it has not decided
whether the actual malice standard can be invoked by non-media defendants.
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 133 n.16. However, it is suggested that the
proposition that the actual malice standard should not apply to non-media
defendants could not stand. First, the New York Times Court found the actual
malice standard to be required by both the freedom of the press and the freedom of speech. See 376 U.S. at 264. Second, the New York Times Court
applied the actual malice standard to 'the non-media defendants as well as to
the newspaper. Id. at 286. Cf. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968)
(actual malice test applied to defendant who was a candidate for public office
whose defamatory remarks were televised); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S 75
(1966) (actual malice test applied to defendant who was not employed by the
media, but was a regular contributor). Third, the author of the Hutchinson
opinion, Chief Justice Burger, has expressed doubt as to the existence of
separate, exclusive rights for the press under the Constitution. First National
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 797-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Burger's view is founded on the belief that the freedom of the press protects
the right of citizens to disseminate their views to the public and that this right
does not " 'belong' to any definable category of persons or entities," but to all.
Id. at 799-802 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Fourth, while several courts have
held the actual malice standard to apply to both media and non-media defendants, no court has ever limited the protection to media defendants. R.
See generally Robertson, supra note 41, at 215-22.
SACK, supra note 4, at 228.
164. See, e.g., Yiamouyiannis v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
619 F.2d at 939. For a discussion of Yiamouyiannis, see notes 147-52 and accompanying text supra.
165. See notes 121-61 and accompanying text supra.
166. Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d at 44. For a discussion of postHutchinson cases which rely on Nader, see notes 139-61 and accompanying text supra. See also DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Hawaii
1979); Howard v. Des Moines Register and Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289
(Iowa 1979); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 413 A.2d 170 (1980).
167. For a discussion of the prior case law, see notes 74-107 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that few courts, if any, have actually deviated
from normal summary judgment procedures in determining the issue of actual
malice. See notes 134-37 and accompanying text supra. Thus it appears that
the Nader majority did indeed create a false conflict by suggesting that there
was a line of cases in which the trial judge made a personal appraisal of the
evidence. See id. Notwithstanding this error in rationale, the conclusion of
the Nader court is firmly supported by reasoned case law.
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dence. 168 The approach originally articulated by Guam, and now reaffirmed by Nader, has always commanded the approval of the majority
169
of jurisdictions.
Because footnote nine has aroused the attention of the appellate
judiciary, 170 however, it is submitted that trial judges can no longer
count on cursory review of their grants of summary judgment to defamation defendants. Thus, as a practical matter, summary judgment will
now only be granted after the trial judge takes a "hard look" at all
the evidence adduced and can find no basis upon which a jury could
171
find actual malice.
The post-Hutchinson courts thus continue to apply the convincing
clarity aspect of New York Times 172 to summary judgment motions. 7 3
It is possible, however, that footnote nine was intended to require more
than just neutrality in procedure and that it was the intent of the footnote to eliminate "convincing clarity" as a consideration at the summary judgment level. 7 4 Such an approach would recognize that the
168. For a discussion of cases which purport to follow Judge Wright's
approach, see notes 88-92 and accompanying text supra.
169. See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d at 60-61 (Harris, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See also Comment, Public Figure Defamation:
PreservingSummary Judgment to Protect Free Expression, 49 FORDHAM L. REv.
112, 128 (1980); Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-In a Public
Figure Libel Action, An Absolute First Amendment Privilege Forbids Compelled Disclosure of a Defendant Newsman's Editorial Process, 47 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 286, 315 n.163 (1978) (noting the decision of the Second Circuit in

Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)).
170. For a discussion of cases which consider the effect of footnote nine,
see notes 124-61 and accompanying text supra.
171. See, e.g., Guam Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1581 v. Ysrael, 492 F.2d at
441; National Nutritional Foods v. Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 379 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp.
947, 954 (D.D.C. 1976). In Whelan, the court stated:
Summary judgment will now safely be granted . . . only after it is

shown that a sufficient opportunity for discovery has been permitted,

and only after the trial judge has made a detailed evaluation of the
evidence . . . . Few judges at any level can be expected consistently
to make this kind of effort, even to prevent harassment of individuals
engaged in protected speech.
492 F. Supp. at 379 (citation omitted).
In addition to scrutinizing the evidence closely, the trial judge must also
determine that the plaintiff has had ample time to utilize discovery to ascertain
the crucial evidence of the defendant's state of. mind. Id. See Yiamouyiannis
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 619 F.2d at 940; National Ass'n of
Government Employees, Inc. v. Central Broadcasting Corp., - Mass. at -, 396
N.E.2d at 1004. However, the trial judge must also consider the chilling effect
of burdensome discovery on the defendant, and in this regard should use its
power to restrict discovery. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 180 (1979) (Powell,

J., concurring).
172. For a discussion of New York Times, see notes 34-48 and accompanying text supra.
173. For a discussion of the post-Hzitchinson cases, see notes 124-61 and
accompanying text supra.
174. See cases cited in note 118 supra.
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plaintiff can best prove his case if he can cross-examine the defendant
175
in front of a jury.
It is submitted, however, that failure to apply the convincing
clarity standard to summary judgments would emasculate New York
Times. 176 The New York Times decision was based on the Court's
recognition that self-censorship could result from fear of liability for
defamation. 177 Therefore, it would seem inconsistent to fail to apply
New York Times, including the convincing clarity test, at every stage
in the proceedings in which liability may be determined. 178 Moreover,
the application of convincing clarity at the summary judgment stage
would also ameliorate any "chilling" effect resulting from fear of bear179
ing the expense of a trial.
Although they have deviated from their previous practice to some
degree in recognition of footnote nine by requiring that the evidence
presented on a motion for summary judgment be given careful consideration, the post-Hutchinson cases have held onto the Guam articulation of the standard to be applied to the evidence. They have properly
refused to accept, it is submitted, a reversal of the well-established
prior practice without a clearer, more authoritative enunciation by the
Supreme Court.' so
The Supreme Court used its Hutchinson footnote to criticize the
widespread practice in the lower courts of granting summary judgment
to defamation defendants.' 8' However, the lower courts, faced with the
convincing clarity mandate of New York Times, 8 2 have found no way
in which to pay due regard to the Hutchinson footnote without abandoning New York Times. 83 The post-Hutchinson decisions, while
expressing agreement with footnote nine, have in effect circumvented
its intent on the basis of the long line of authorities supporting the
notion that summary judgment must be granted in favor of defamation
175. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. at 120 n.9. For a further discussion
of Hutchinson, see notes 108-20 and accompanying text supra. For the text of
footnote nine, see text accompanying note 21 supra. See also note 74 supra.
176. For a discussion of the convincing clarity standard, see note 45 supra.
177. For a discussion of New York Times, see notes 34-48 and accompany.
ing text supra.
178. The convincing clarity standard, it is submitted, is inexorably tied to

the actual malice standard, and has become part and parcel of the liability test.
For a discussion of convincing clarity, see note 45 supra.
179. For a discussion of the chilling effect of trial, see notes 13-15 S 83-86
and accompanying text supra.
180. See Brophy v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., - Pa. Super. Ct. at -,
422 A.2d at 634-35 (Spaeth, J., concurring).
181. For a discussion of Hutchinson, see notes 108-20 and accompanying text

supra. For a discussion of the widespread practice, see note 86 and accompanying text supra.
182. For a discussion of New York Times, see notes 34-48 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 125-61 and accompanying text supra.
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defendants where the plaintiff does not offer proof of actual malice
with convincing clarity.184
While it is unclear just how far the Burger Court might go in
restricting New York Times and its progeny, the tone of footnote nine
does not augur well for future media defendants. 18 However, for now,
any alteration in the practice of granting summary judgments must
await further clarification by the Supreme Court, in a manner more

persuasive than a single footnote. 80
Kevin Gerard Amadio

184. For a discussion of the post-Hutchinson cases, see id.
185. See note 19 supra.

186. See note 180 and accompanying text supra.
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